>> The extent of the global threat posed by the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 pandemic cannot yet be reliably assessed. As in similar historical examples, this pandemic also calls for stringent government action that explicitly refers to scientific findings and opinions beyond the existing legal basis. This interaction between politics and science is desirable to overcome such a crisis, but only represents a sensible approach for both sides if the breadth of relevant scientific approaches and technical expertise is accurately reflected and different perspectives have their say.
The pandemics of the past have clearly shown that the scientific and diagnostic findings that are primarily in demand are indispensable, but alone are not sufficient to successfully manage a pandemic. Secondarily, the medical and nursing disciplines and professional groups must be included, especially since health care and nursing facilities play a central role not only as places of treatment and care, but also as places of spread (see below: SARS-CoV- 2/Covid-19 as a nosocomial infection).
In broadening the perspective - starting from the insight that an "escape" from the crisis caused by the pandemic is only possible through multiple interventions at multiple levels - findings from the fields of epidemiology, behavioral psychology, cognitive sciences, public health, sociology, economics, law and political science can be used. The focus is on the disciplines that have experience and knowledge in improvement management on a social and institutional level, especially against the background of infectious problems; Here we should particularly think of specialists in the management of multi-resistant pathogens and antibiotic resistance and of experts in the fight against epidemics such as Ebola. Although overcoming the pandemic is the priority goal, last but not least, we must not lose sight of the fact that all measures must be measured equally based on whether they guarantee and promote the continued existence of social values and living conditions. Since the socio-political implications of a state or executive-dominated crisis response largely affect the normative foundations of a democratic social model, the focus of scientific-political interaction must also be on questions of social balance and economic foundations at the national, multilateral and global levels (Abele -Brehm et al. 2020) and the legitimacy of the democratic system.
This thesis paper makes a conscious selection from this wide range of topics. The focus of this selection relates firstly to epidemiological questions, secondly to the further development of prevention measures and thirdly to the socio-political implications.

SARS-CoV-2 is a zoonosis with a reservoir in the animal kingdom that has not yet been conclusively identified and is transmitted from person to person as a droplet infection. A smear infection via inanimate surfaces is unlikely because although viral genetic material can be detected, no infectious virus can be detected in the culture (Streeck 2020). The first case series are small and inhomogeneous (Bhatraju et al. 2020, An der Heiden and Buchholz 2020, Onder et al. 2020). The infectivity is high; on average, each infected person infects significantly more than one other person, resulting in a so-called doubling time (see below) between 2 and over 5 days. Epidemiologically significant is the high rate of asymptomatic, infectious virus carriers (up to 80% of infected people); in addition, in infected people who develop symptoms (20%), these symptoms are preceded by an asymptomatic phase of 1-2 days in which they are also already infectious.
In both cases, the diagnosis of the infection is only possible through laboratory tests. However, given limited testing resources, these tests (virus detection) are only initiated if anamnestic information indicates an increased risk (e.g. stay in risk areas, contact with infected people). Of those who are symptomatically infected, an unknown proportion require inpatient treatment, which in many cases leads to intensive care treatment and ventilation therapy. The mortality rate of ventilated patients is high.
As the first published series show, the need for inpatient treatment and mortality and prognosis depend significantly on age and the number of comorbidities; The greatest risk is for patients over 80 years of age with multiple comorbidities. Although younger patients require intensive care in individual cases, they have a relatively good prognosis.
In practice, the infection is detected via PCR detection of the virus genome; an antigen test is being tested. PCR detects genetic material of the virus (e.g. also on inanimate surfaces), but this detection is not identical to infectivity (virus culture negative). SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19-specific detection of antibodies to identify protected people who have survived the disease is not yet available.
The sensitivity and specificity of PCR detection is high, but is obviously reduced in everyday life by technical problems (swab technology, storage, etc.). Statements on the positive/negative predictive value under different prevalence conditions or on discrimination in the diagnostic process are not yet available due to the lack of widely applicable standard procedures and because of the short period of time since the emergence of Covid-19.
The state of epidemiological knowledge and the underlying concepts are currently the subject of widespread criticism by leading scientists at home and abroad (a selection: Ferdinand Gerlach, Chairman of the Expert Council for the Assessment of Developments in Health Care (Gerlach 2020); John Ioannidis, Stanford University, as one the world's leading specialists in the field of clinical epidemiology (Ioannidis 2020); German Network Evidence-Based Medicine (2020)). Questions relating to the interpretation of frequency information and mortality data as well as the expected spread patterns will be discussed below.

The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) publishes daily the number of cases reported in Germany and verified by the RKI (alternatively, the case numbers from Johns Hopkins University can be used). However, these numbers do not allow any statements to be made about prevalence, period prevalence or even incidence over a period of, for example, one month
• the total number of tests carried out is only incompletely known (then it would be possible to state the prevalence at least based on the total number of tests: “in the population tested, the percentage of infected people is x%”),
• no systematic testing is carried out based on a defined population (but only event-related testing when symptoms occur) ("in a randomly selected population of 100,000 people, the percentage of infected people is x%").

If one were to make decisions dependent on the speed of the virus spread measured by the doubling of the number of people who tested positive, one would have to refer to systematically obtained population samples or longitudinal studies. In the current situation, more sensible endpoints are e.g. B. due to the indication for inpatient or intensive care treatment provided that it relates to a specific case definition. As explained below regarding mortality, detection of the virus is not sufficient; specific signs of the disease (e.g. interstitial pneumonia) must be taken into account.

The cumulative presentation of new daily diagnosed cases gives the impression of a catastrophic increase and should therefore be replaced by a presentation that puts the total number of asymptomatic and recovered patients alongside the new infections, because this makes it clear that most (estimated value 98%) the infected do not suffer any permanent damage.

Regardless of the points mentioned above, specifying a number of infected people at a certain point in time (e.g. “today”) in a dynamic event is not relevant for this point in time, but rather refers to a point in time in the past. Although it is difficult to estimate how far back this point was, this estimate is of great importance because since this point in the past the number of infected people has either continued to rise or has fallen. Must be taken into account in the estimate
• the incubation period between infection and the appearance of symptoms (eg five days);
• the period between the onset of symptoms and the test being carried out (e.g. five days);
• the period of technical test execution (e.g. two days) and
• The reporting delay from the time the test result is available to the report to the RKI (e.g. three days).

The estimates mentioned here add up to a total delay of 15 days. In the past 15 days, the number of infected people has most likely increased significantly in the current situation (see Fig. 1).

Even knowing the point in time (day A distinction must be made here between symptomatic and asymptomatic infected people:
• Symptomatically infected people (20%): one must assume that not all those with symptoms will be tested because, for example, they “pass as normal flu”. Assumption: 50% of the symptomatically infected people are tested, or 10% of all infected people;
• Asymptomatic infected people (80%): of the asymptomatic people, numerous people are tested, for example as part of environmental investigations, but the majority are not recorded. Assumption: a quarter of the asymptomatic infected people will be tested (20% of all infected people).

In summary, one can assume that around a third (10 plus 20%) of all infected people will be tested on day X-15 and two thirds will escape testing.
Figure 1 shows an example of this scenario based on day X, March 17th (around 8,000 known infected people at that time). Day X-15 corresponds to March 1st (days 13/14 are counted as one day due to the change in the reporting procedure). What is crucial is that the number of 24,000 infected people on day X-15 went through five doubling times of 3 days each by day If you use three doubling times of 5 days each, you get 192,000 infected people. These considerations obviously represent a model with numerous assumptions and are therefore subject to several uncertainties. However, they are intended to illustrate the problem using examples.

In order to clarify the important questions about prevalence and incidence, it is necessary to examine a representative sample analogous to the national cohort for HIV infection in the 1980s. Appropriate approaches, such as those currently being pursued at some research institutions, should be given the highest priority for the purpose of improving the control of prevention measures. The size must include at least 10,000 people in order to be able to stratify with regard to the known risk factors and make statements about the high-risk groups; iterative testing, for example bi-weekly testing, must be included.
Furthermore, such a procedure is also able to provide information about infections that have been overcome (and, if an antibody test is available, later also about acquired immunity). It must not be forgotten: the frightening figures regarding the increase in the number of infected people are clearly put into perspective when one takes into account the number of patients or people who have survived the infection without or with manageable symptoms.

Information on the lethality of a disease (case fatality rate) plays a crucial role in assessing an epidemic such as SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19. However, lethality can only be used meaningfully as an indicator if several conditions are met:
• the total population to which the number of deaths is based must be known;
• mortality due to the disease must be differentiated from mortality due to natural history and other diseases (attributable mortality);
• In historical comparison, the mortality of the disease should result in additional mortality (excess mortality), especially if the disease in question was not yet known or diagnosable in the comparison periods. In the case of seasonal illnesses, a seasonal comparison makes sense.

The RKI relates the lethality to the number of reported cases, which, according to current procedures, depends heavily on the availability of tests (see point 1.1, RKI 2020). There is actually only a single small sample that allows a statement to be made here, namely the quarantined passengers of the Diamond Princess (3,711 people, 705 infected people during the 17-day quarantine in the port of Yokohama, 10 deaths; NZZ March 15, 2020). However, since the conditions on a cruise ship cannot be described as representative, these figures cannot be transferred to the situation in Germany.

The lethality of Covid-19 shows a clear dependency on age and an equally clear dependency on comorbidity or the number of comorbidities. This picture also applies to hospital mortality independent of SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19. Since mortality will play a significant role in the medical, nursing and public discussion in the near future, it is important that only the following criteria for Covid-related mortality that are used in the literature can be used (Onder et al. 2020) :
• Covid-19 detection and
• Death of the patient

This means that there are no criteria that can be used to distinguish uncorrected crude mortality from attributable mortality - in other words, and perhaps more pointedly: we do not know whether the patient died of Covid-19 or not with Covid-19. There is also no definition of Covid-19-related mortality on the RKI website (but there is a definition of Covid-19 disease; as of April 5, 2020).
Similar to the case definition, a remedy could be created by including characteristic disease-specific criteria, such as the presence of (interstitial) pneumonia as a third criterion. The lack of a definition of COVID-19-associated mortality is all the more serious because the definition is likely to play a significant role in current practice, because if an older patient with several previous illnesses acutely suffers a stroke and requires inpatient treatment, one should be treated upon admission However, if he finds out that he is also an asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carrier, then he must be treated in the hospital like a Covid-19 patient, not least because he poses a risk of transmission to other patients and employees.
If the patient dies of his stroke after 24 hours, it is not unlikely that he will be recorded in the statistics as a Covid-19 death. The Italian study (Onder et al. 2020) therefore urgently calls for a re-analysis of the Italian deaths. For the near future, it is therefore essential to arrive at a definition of attributable mortality, which should contain the following elements:
• Covid-19 detection and
• Death of the patient
• specific clinical picture.

With regard to the third point “specific clinical picture”, one could, for example, proceed by defining main criteria, one of which must be fulfilled (e.g. interstitial pneumonia), and secondary criteria, two of which are sufficient for the diagnosis. This was also the case with AIDS, for example, before the pathogen could be detected.

A key question in the current situation and in assessing the urgency of preventive measures is whether SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 actually leads to additional morbidity that goes beyond the “normal level” (e.g. hospital admissions of old multimorbid patients , occurrence of (interstitial) pneumonia, etc.) and in particular increased mortality in vulnerable Covid-19 risk groups is or has occurred. The comparison must be made with matched populations that were treated during the same periods in recent years, when a test for SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 was not yet available and, for example, quarantine of hospital or nursing staff was therefore not feasible was.

The role of nursing, care and hospital institutions in the spread of Covid-19 is only slowly becoming the focus of the discussion (Nacoti et al. 2020). There is a lot of reporting about the sometimes unsustainable conditions in the institutions (especially in terms of the lack of protective equipment) and also about transmissions between patients and employees, but there is no definitive statement that this pandemic is at least one In some cases it is a nosocomial infection, in which the institutions of the health and care system play a central role in terms of spread and dynamics.
Of course, the risk factor of contact with known infected people remains, but the role of institutions in the development of specific prevention strategies must still receive central attention (see below). Historically, this is not an isolated case (plague, cholera, Ebola); in the case of HIV infection, transmission in an institutional setting was not so important, but it did occur through infection through transfusions and blood products.
The role of care and supply institutions is essential for the establishment of target group-specific prevention strategies (see below). A lack of staff, a lack of protective materials and inadequate testing options make it significantly more difficult to maintain adequate care in the care process. Isolation measures in nursing homes in the context of inadequate protective materials and insufficient staffing must be assessed critically and support measures should not be neglected. This applies equally to the outpatient care sector. The unforeseeable occurrence within local foci (clusters, see below) is closely related to the nosocomial problem. Staying in risk areas will become less important, especially because of the restrictions on freedom of movement.

Epidemics are complex events and, due to their erratic, unpredictable occurrence, cause the greatest fears for everyone involved (Heinsberg, Würzburg, Wolfsburg ...). This occurrence of completely new, seemingly paradoxical and unforeseeable events, which occur “out of nowhere” so to speak, is referred to as emergence (Schrappe 2018, p. 171 ff.) and must be included in the analysis of the current situation. In the current SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 epidemic, unexpected, sometimes seemingly catastrophic individual developments will repeatedly occur (occurrence of so-called clusters), which must be taken into account in the orientation of prevention strategies (see below).
Furthermore, when evaluating prevention strategies, one should not assume a linear principle of effectiveness and give in to the illusion that such complex events can be positively influenced using a simple actio-reactio logic. Instead, complexity theory teaches that one-dimensional interventions are more likely to result in unpredictable, paradoxical consequences. In the recent past, this circumstance was already evident in the Italian government's attempt to reduce imported Covid-19 cases by banning flights from China; The consequence was that the passengers rebooked via Frankfurt and Amsterdam and were no longer available for checks (e.g. temperature measurement).
Additionally, interventions in complex systems are highly context-sensitive, so interventions that work in one context will fail in another context. You have to prepare decision-makers for the occurrence of emergent, local individual events and for unexpected (paradoxical) effects and warn them against premature optimism, but also pessimism. SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 will take on highly local and erratic characteristics in its development, causing serious problems in some places but largely leaving other places alone. The art of implementing prevention measures will be to implement adapted solutions.
In summary, the following thesis can be formulated regarding the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19, which is made up of four sub-theses:

Thesis 1:
The available epidemiological data (reported infections, mortality) are not sufficient to describe the spread and pattern of spread of the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 pandemic and can therefore only be used to a limited extent to support far-reaching decisions.

Thesis 1.1:
The number of reported infections has little significance because no population-based approach was chosen, the measurement refers to a point in time in the past and a high rate of untested (especially asymptomatic) infected people can be assumed.

Thesis 1.2:
The mortality figures (case fatality rate) currently overestimate the problem and cannot be interpreted validly: lack of delimitation of the population, lack of consideration of attributable mortality, lack of period comparison over several years in the same patient collectives with pneumonia.

Thesis 1.3:
SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted to other patients and employees as a nosocomial infection in hospitals and nursing or care facilities.

Thesis 1.4:
SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 represents a local outbreak (cluster) with an unpredictable pattern of occurrence.

This thesis paper is based on the fact that a therapy and a vaccination will not be available until 2021 at the earliest. Furthermore, it is assumed that effective prevention strategies rarely rely on one-dimensional interventions, but rather are composed of several sub-strategies that attack at different levels. There are differences to be made
• general interventions aimed at all exposed people (here: the entire population excluding those who are already immune),
• and those interventions that target specific risk groups.

This can be clearly illustrated using the historical example of HIV infection (before the availability of effective antiretroviral therapies): the general intervention was aimed at precautionary measures and the sexual behavior of the entire population ("AIDS affects everyone"), the specific interventions were aimed at Risk groups, e.g. homosexual men (acceptance of AIDS assistance, specific programs to change behavior) or intravenous drug addicts (e.g. substitution programs). Only the interaction of general and specific interventions was able to stabilize the situation to such an extent that medical approaches could be tested and become effective.

General, population-based prevention strategies are used in almost all countries where SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 has emerged. They are based on the assumption that only a fraction of those infected can be identified through testing for SARS-CoV-2 and contact tracing and that the further spread of the virus must therefore be prevented through general measures. The focus here is primarily on breaking contact and identifying infected people. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore appear to be exceptions, where, for example, through intensive tracking, the spread of the virus was inhibited at a low level to such an extent that a general shutdown was not necessary.
The general prevention strategies are applied in different countries in a graduated form. The measures range from recommendations (stay at home, avoid gatherings) to restrictions on freedom of movement and professional practice, to a complete shutdown with an almost complete standstill of social and economic life (e.g. Italy, Spain) to a complete shutdown combined with total surveillance at the level of individual citizens (e.g. China).
The following three points need to be highlighted:

The situation and the effectiveness of the measures in China are difficult to assess due to the politicization of the epidemic and the severely restricted freedom of the press. However, in European countries with strict regulations regarding the shutdown, even after several weeks of operation, such as in Italy (since March 8, 2020), there is no significant improvement in the situation in sight (apart from a slight flattening), neither measured by the reported number of infections still measured by mortality. Of course, it should be noted that there is no comparison group, meaning that one does not know what course the infection numbers would have taken if no measures had been taken. However, the important observation remains that there is no major difference between the countries in either the number of infections or the mortality rate, which could be attributed to the different levels of exit restrictions and restrictions on professional practice. In particular, it cannot be seen that with greater restrictions up to and including a shutdown, the spread would be significantly delayed than if “only” lower-level recommendations were given, for example on social distancing. In particular, the protection of risk groups (especially old age and multimorbidity) is not achieved through the general, non-specific prevention measures; on the contrary, a risk to these groups cannot be ruled out due to the limited effectiveness of these measures.
It is therefore important to point out the assessment of the German Ethics Council that in the event that a strategy “... does not lead to the desired success in avoiding an overload of the health system within a set period of time ...” or “... others health, economic and psychosocial damage..." predominate, "... the legitimacy of the strategy [ends]" (German Ethics Council 2020).

However, if one assumes that the various containment strategies are effective despite the above-mentioned limitations, major difficulties arise in that one does not know how to limit the corresponding procedure in terms of time. The more effective the “flattening of the curve” is, the more likely it is that new waves will occur after the measures are relaxed, because relevant immunity in the population could not be achieved in the previous wave. Depending on the seasonality of the infection, the winter of 2020/21 will be particularly important, especially if additional negative influences due to the deterioration of the social and nutritional situation cannot be ruled out.

Even with prevention measures, especially when they have a profound impact on the social and political life of a society, the expected benefits must be weighed against the possible negative consequences (see statement by the German Ethics Council 2020). There are numerous voices that point out that there is a good chance that the collateral consequences will have a greater negative impact on the population than the actual pandemic (Abele-Brehm et al. 2020, Konrad and Thum 2020, Straubhaar 2020 ). In its current special report, the Advisory Council for the Assessment of Overall Economic Development has pointed out that there is a clear connection between the continued restrictions on freedom of movement and professional practice and the expected economic consequences (SVR 2020).
There is also agreement that restricting social contacts and unemployment also pose a relevant risk of morbidity. In addition to the biological infection, there must not be a social and emotional infection through fears that could lead to undesirable social consequences (e.g. slandering neighbors; insulting old people in discount stores; stigmatization). The review of proportionality must therefore be carried out on an ongoing basis and cannot be undertaken once for an indefinite period of time. Furthermore, normative limits in the constitutional constitution must be taken into account.

The current approach is not sufficiently theoretically justified as an isolated measure because, as explained in the section on epidemiology, Covid-19 is not an epidemic that affects all parts of the population equally, but rather an epidemic with relatively precisely identifiable risk groups
• high age,
• comorbidity,
• nosocomial risk and
• Contact with local clusters.

Due to their complexity, it does not seem worthwhile to rely on a single form of measures, namely the indiscriminate restriction of personal contacts. So - unlike, for example, an influenza epidemic, where there is (incomplete) immunity in the older population due to the previous waves of infection - it is incomprehensible why children and people of younger age cannot move freely, at least as long as they are older people or do not contact those with predispositions. This is all the more true as this group will most likely become infected over the course of the epidemic (but will not or will only rarely become ill). Above all, however, the point that needs to be emphasized is that complex systems do not respond to a one-dimensional measure or a measure that only intervenes on one level. Instead, one must resort to interventions that are well thought out and address multiple levels simultaneously and use multiple access options (e.g. administrative instructions plus social processes plus technical tools plus institutional starting points, etc.).
There is very good scientific evidence for this; sustained improvements in the area of nosocomial infections in intensive care units, which are also seen as highly complex systems, could only be controlled through multiple interventions (Pronovost et al. 2006).

The risk groups mentioned under point 1 (old age, multimorbidity, nosocomial risk, contact with clusters) must be addressed through targeted prevention strategies and concentrate on protecting these vulnerable groups.
• old age: maximum protection for the older population from infection, assistance with care, medical and nursing care on site with protective measures, as a further example, a special 2-hour slot in the morning for shopping with selective restraint on the part of the younger population;
• Comorbidity: stratification of isolation and support based on individual comorbidity;
• nosocomial contact: Concentration on health care and nursing facilities by transferring knowledge and strategies from the infection control area, guidelines for minimum standards of action, prioritizing protective measures for employees, standardizing procedures when employees are infected, pooled testing of all employees Establishment, advance establishment of separate care areas, development of guidelines for the use of personnel who have experienced the infection, unbureaucratic financial assistance, support from the high-risk task force;
• Occurrence of clusters: Since clusters (as shown above) will continue to occur in the medium and long term, following an unpredictable pattern, it is crucial to clarify such local crisis situations (e.g. currently in Würzburg or Wolfsburg), teams of experts will be on site practically without delay to provide support with the upcoming measures. These operations must be legitimized by legal measures and must not be hindered by overlapping competences. It must be clearly emphasized in communication that such clusters do not represent a measure of general, population-related development, but only have local significance, otherwise the reporting based on local sources would lead to the impression of a general catastrophe.

When developing these specific prevention strategies, the nursing profession, which explicitly works on and with patients at all points, must be fully involved. Your radius of action depends largely on the framework conditions created and available.

Provided that the specific prevention measures mentioned in point 5 are implemented, a targeted opening of the general, non-specific prevention measures can take place. Although the risk of infection and morbidity in the younger parts of the population cannot be neglected, in the current situation this risk must and must be weighed against the protection of the older population, which cannot be achieved with current measures, with its much higher risk of morbidity and mortality and the massive social consequences .

In summary, the following thesis 2 can be formulated here:

Throughout history, epidemics have regularly played an important role in shaping state structures in coordination with other social developments (from the extensive literature see Slack 2015, Göckenjan 1988). In the crisis, a “strong state” is called for, the instrument of “epidemic police” and direct action appear to be no alternative, and social developments are initiated that previously seemed unthinkable. This is also the case now: The FAZ of March 31, 2020 quotes a spokesman for the Federal Ministry under the title “Berlin plans electronic tracking” with the additional statement that this measure is “a prerequisite for easing measures”.
One can well discuss whether the desired digitalization of the healthcare system with its individual control approach satisfies ethical, normative or political principles or merely represents an approach to economizing one of the last remaining private spheres, but the implied connection between accepting cell phone surveillance of the population and that Relaxation of the “contact ban” is a process that must be discussed intensively in a timely manner, completely independent of the epidemiological scenario and its assessment (see Chapter 1). Of course, the cell phone apps intended for control are still voluntary, but the idea that the next step could be the order to only allow entering a supermarket with the Bluetooth function switched on goes far beyond basic democratic rights.
This rise in authoritarian ideas would not only follow historical parallels, but can currently be observed in many countries around the world. Those in power are sometimes given absolutist powers, dictatorial regimes are expanded, and censorship is tightened (also with regard to the discussion of the current SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 crisis). It is repeatedly promised that these measures are only temporary, but it is unlikely that the executive branch will voluntarily “give back” the powers granted in times of crisis. However, the tendency described should only be mentioned here in an accompanying manner and the expectation should be expressed that German society is stable enough to capture the mentioned tendencies again: we want to recognize our country after Covid-19. However, it must be made very clear: From the authors' point of view, bonds with totalitarian systems (e.g. China) or authoritarian systems, for example with a developed social credit system such as Singapore, are not compatible with this expectation of recognition.

Even if it is always said that “everyone is equal before the epidemic”, this cannot be assumed. Neither the economic burdens (loss of income) nor the psychosocial restrictions (actual curfew for families in small apartments vs. single-family houses with a garden, problems of intra-family violence, etc.) or the ability to teach the children themselves over a longer period of time (educationally disadvantaged vs. education-oriented Families) are equally distributed. The opportunities of disabled people or elderly people requiring care are significantly more limited than is the case for other population groups.
Due to the risk of a long-term economic crisis, it is to be expected that the conflicts mentioned will continue to intensify in the medium term. The involvement of experts to deal with the resulting problems is therefore urgently recommended (Abele-Brehm et al. 2020, Krott and Böcher 2020). Sensitivity to social factors is one of the strongest arguments for developing target group-specific programs that can better address the needs of these groups and thereby better protect them.

In times of an epidemic, the legal foundations of society are not suspended, but can only experience a temporary relativization in accordance with the principle of proportionality (Paper 2020). However, the debate over the amendment to the Infection Protection Act with a focus on Section 5 has shown that this aspect is currently not given adequate weight, because here the Federal Minister of Health is given almost unlimited power to dispose of state organs and the restrictions on civil rights, which can be exercised by means of regulations (Kingreen 2020, Straubhaar 2020).
Apart from the detection of the pandemic, parliamentary control is no longer planned. In fact, the principle of proportionality essentially means that prevention measures (a) must be subject to continuous review with regard to their time limit, (b) must be open to discussion at any time with regard to their goal orientation (Volkmann 2020) and (c) above all on those people that actually require protection. A minor, but increasingly important, aspect in the future will be the restriction of the fundamental rights of people immune to SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19, for whom there is no justification for corresponding measures to protect either themselves or the community .

Although a restriction of fundamental rights may be permissible in individual cases, taking into account the proportionality according to points (a) and (b) of the previous section, the priority of the principle of the rule of law and democracy must not be questioned. This applies, on the one hand, because this situation would otherwise set a precedent for other situations, and on the other hand, because abandoning the rule of law and democratic constitution would impair the ability of society to function. Particularly with regard to the important issue of health care, abandoning democratic discourse would lead to suboptimal solutions and thus impair an essential basis for the health of the population.
The alleged successes of authoritarian systems in overcoming the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 crisis are currently being highly praised, but it is highly likely that this “performance” represents an artificial effect, for example through state coercive measures or censorship and changes to the reporting procedure. At the beginning of the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 pandemic, valuable time was lost because transparency was not desired (for information on the timing, see the article in the SZ from April 4, 2020). Authoritarian systems ultimately suppress the performance of a society because they have to invest too many resources in maintaining the system (Habermas 2020, p. 19). The non-negotiable principle must therefore apply to European democracies that the democratic form of society must not be played off against health.

Due to their scientific and technical focus, the authors of this thesis paper welcome the inclusion of scientific expertise in dealing with the current crisis caused by the SARS-CoV-2/Covid-19 infection. However, they point out two dangers: on the one hand, reference to scientific findings must not weaken or question the political character of conflictual decision-making situations and the responsibility for their democratic safeguarding. Such a development would be likely to aggravate the legitimacy crisis of democracy that is repeatedly mentioned in the current political discussion (criticism of “expertocracy”). On the other hand, especially when demand for advice is selective or aimed at confirmation, science can lose its balance based on multidimensionality and thus be damaged. This argument brings us to the beginning of this thesis paper. <<
In summary, the following Thesis 3 is formulated here:

Thesis 3:
The emergence and combating of a pandemic are embedded in social processes. The current general prevention strategy (partial shutdown) may initially have been the right remedy in a confusing situation, but it carries the risk of increasing social inequality and other conflicts. There is still a risk of a conflict with the normative and legal foundations of society. Democratic principles must not be pitted against health and civil rights. The involvement of experts from science and practice must be carried out on a broad scale that counteracts such a development.